Eliminating
Race- and Ethnic-Based
Preferences in Public Employment
and Education
While
California's move to eliminate race- and ethnic-based preferences in public
employment and education was upheld this spring, a similar measure failed
to gain passage in the Arizona legislature.
Last December, in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, a US
District Court judge issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement
of the California Civil Rights Initiative, or Prop. 209.
The controversial voter initiative deems it unlawful for California state
agencies and institutions of higher education to "discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting."
On April 8, however, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling, and announced
that Prop. 209 does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the US Constitution.
That provision holds that "[n]o State . . . shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
According to the panel (two of whose members were named to the bench by
President Reagan, the third by President Bush), "[t]he controlling
words, we must remember, are 'equal' and 'protection.'"
Distinguishing between "political obstructions to equal treatment"
and "political obstructions to preferential treatment," the
panel cautioned that preferences are inherently discriminatory: "When
the government prefers individuals on account of their race or gender,
it correspondingly disadvantages individuals who fortuitously belong to
another race or to the other gender.
"Where
a state," the Court reasoned, "denies someone a job, an education,
or a seat on the bus because of her race or gender, the injury to that
individual is clear.
"The
person who wants to work, study, or ride but cannot because she is black
or a woman is denied equal protection. Where, as here, a state prohibits
race or gender preferences at any level of government, the injury to any
specific individual is utterly inscrutable. No one contends that individuals
have a constitutional right to preferential treatment solely on the basis
of their race or gender. Quite the contrary."
Meanwhile, Arizona's version of Prop. 209 (which was introduced in its
House of Representatives) did not emerge this year among the enactments
passed by 43rd Legislature during its regular session.
If approved, HB2223 would have outlawed "preferential treatment .
. . in the operation of public employment, public education or public
contracting" on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national
origin.
A similar proposal will undoubtedly be offered in the Legislature during
its next session; and though support for such a measure might gain impetus
from the Ninth Circuit's ruling over Prop. 209, that decision is nearly
certain to be presented for review by the US Supreme Court.
Published
in the Summer 1997 Edition of In Brief
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